Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
It is to the phenomena only, then, that our attention is to be
given, not to any vain inquiries into the absolute nature of the
substances which exhibit the phenomena. This alone is legitimate
philosophy,--philosophy which must forever retain its claim to our
assent, amid the rise and fall of all those spurious speculations,
to which our vanity is so fond of giving the names of _theory_ and
_system_. Whatever that may be, in itself, which feels, and thinks, and
wills,--if our feelings, and thoughts, and volitions be the same--all
which we can know, and compare, and arrange, must be the same; and,
while we confine our attention to these, the general laws of their
succession which we infer, and the various relations which they seem to
bear to each other, may be admitted equally by those whose opinions,
as to the absolute nature of the feeling and thinking principle,
differ fundamentally. It requires no peculiar supposition, or belief,
as to the nature of the mind, to know, that its trains of thought
are influenced, by former habits, or casual association; and every
fact, which the immaterialist has accurately observed and arranged,
with respect to the influence of habit or association, may thus, with
equal reason, form a part of the intellectual and moral creed of the
materialist also.
On these two systems it is not at present my intention to make any
remarks; all which I wish, now, is to explain to you, how independent
the real philosophy of the mind is, of any fanciful conjectures, which
may be formed, with respect to its essence. It differs from these, as
Mr. Stewart has well observed, in the same manner “as the inquiries of
Galileo, concerning the laws of moving bodies, differ from the disputes
of the ancient Sophists, concerning the existence and the nature of
motion,” or as the conclusions of Newton, with respect to the law of
gravitation, differ from his query concerning the mode in which he
supposed that gravity might possibly be produced. The hypothesis,
involved in the query, you may admit or reject; the conclusions, with
respect to the law of gravitation itself, as far as relates to our
planetary system, are, I may say, almost beyond your power of rejecting.
The philosophy of mind then, and the philosophy of matter, agree, in
this respect, that our knowledge is, in both, confined to the mere
phenomena. They agree also, in the two species of inquiry which they
admit. The phenomena of _mind_, in the same manner as we have seen in
the case of _matter_, may be considered as complex and susceptible of
analysis, or they may be considered as successive in a certain _order_,
and bearing, therefore, to each other the reciprocal relation of causes
and effects.
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