Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
That to know, in the series of mental phenomena, _what_ are the
antecedents, and _what_ their consequents, is one great branch of the
Philosophy of Mind, I surely need not attempt to demonstrate; and it
would be equally superfluous to demonstrate its importance, especially
after the remarks--if even these were necessary,--which I made in a
former Lecture; since it is not merely, as a very interesting branch
of speculative knowledge, that it is valuable, but, as I then showed,
still more valuable, as the foundation of every intellectual art,
especially of those noble and almost divine arts, which have, for their
immediate object, the illumination and amendment of mankind--the art
of training ignorance to wisdom, and even wisdom itself to knowledge
still more sublime,--of fixing youthful innocence in the voluntary
practice of virtue, that is as yet little more than an _instinct_ of
which it is scarcely conscious,--of breathing that moral inspiration,
which strengthens feeble goodness, when it is about to fall, tames even
the wildest excesses of the wildest passions, and leads back, as if by
the invisible power of some guardian spirit, even Guilt itself, to the
happiness which it had lost, and the holier wishes, which it rejoices
to feel once more.
Since the phenomena of the mind, however, are obviously _successive_,
like those of matter, the consideration of the sequences of the mental
phenomena, and the arrangement of them in certain classes, may appear
to you sufficiently analogous to the consideration and arrangement of
the sequences of the phenomena of the material world. But that there
should be any inquiries, in the philosophy of mind, corresponding
with the inquiries into the composition of bodies, may appear to you
improbable, or almost absurd; since the mind, and consequently its
affections--which I use as a short general term for expressing all the
variety of the modes in which it can be affected, and which, therefore,
are only the mind itself as it exists in different states,--must be
always _simple_ and _indivisible_. Yet, wonderful, or even absurd,
as it may seem, notwithstanding the absolute simplicity of the mind
itself, and consequently of all its feelings or momentary states,--the
Science of Mind is, in its most important respects, a source of
analysis, or of a process which I have said to be virtually the same as
analysis; and it is only, as it is in this virtual sense analytical,
that any discovery, at least that any important discovery, can be
expected to be made in it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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