Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
When I speak, however, of the union of separate thoughts and feelings
in one complex sentiment or emotion, and of the analytic power of
reflection or reason, it must not be conceived, that I use these
words in a sense precisely the same as when they are applied to
matter. A mass of matter, as we have seen, is, in truth, not _one_
body merely, but a _multitude_ of contiguous bodies; all of which, at
the time, may be considered as having a separate existence, and as
placed together more by accidental apposition, than by any essential
union;--and _analysis_ is nothing more than what its etymology denotes,
a _loosening_ of these from each other. In strictness of language,
this composition and analysis cannot take place in _mind_. Even the
most complex feeling is still only _one_ feeling; for we cannot divide
the states or affections of our mind into separate self-existing
fractions, as we can divide a compound mass of matter into masses,
which are separate and self-existing,--nor distinguish _half_ a joy or
sorrow from a _whole_ joy or sorrow. The conception of gold, and the
conception of a mountain, may separately arise, and may be followed
by the conception of a golden mountain; which may be said to be a
compound of the two, in the sense in which I use that word, to express
merely, that what is thus termed compound or complex is the result
of certain previous feelings, to which, as if existing together, it
is felt to have the virtual relation of equality, or the relation
which a whole bears to the parts that are comprehended in it. But
the conception of a _golden mountain_ is still as much _one_ state
or feeling of one simple mind, as either of the separate conceptions
of gold and of a mountain which preceded it. In cases of this kind,
indeed, it is the very nature of the resulting feeling to seem to us
thus complex; and we are led, by the very constitution of our mind
itself, to consider what we term a complex idea, as equivalent to the
separate ideas from which it results, or as comprehensive of them,--as
being truly to our conception--though to our conception only--and,
therefore, only virtually or relatively to us the inquirers--the same,
as if it were composed of the separate feelings _co-existing_, as the
elements of a body co-exist in space.
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