Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
Analysis, then, in the Science of Mind, you will perceive, is founded
wholly on the feeling of relation which one state of mind seems to
us to bear to other states of mind, as comprehensive of them; but,
while this seeming complexity is felt, it is the same thing to our
analysis, as if the complexity, instead of being virtual and relative
only, were absolute and real. It may be objected to the application of
the term _analysis_ to the Science of Mind, that it is a term which,
its etymology shews, as I have already admitted, to be borrowed from
matter, and to convey, as applied to the mind, a notion in some degree
different from its etymological sense. But this is an objection which
may be urged, with at least equal force, against every term, or almost
every term, of our science. In our want of a peculiar metaphysical
language, we are obliged in this, as in every other case, to borrow
a metaphysical language from the material world; and we are very
naturally led to speak of mental composition and analysis, since to the
mind which feels the relation of equivalence or comprehensiveness, it
is precisely the same thing as if our ideas and emotions, that result
from former ideas and emotions, and are felt by us as if involving
these in one complex whole, could be actually divided into the separate
elements which appear to us thus virtually or relatively to be
comprehended in them.
It is from having neglected this branch of the physical investigation
of the mind,--by far the more important of the two,--and having fixed
their attention solely on the successions of its phenomena, that some
philosophers have been led to disparage the science as fruitless of
discovery, and even to deride the pretensions or the hopes of those who
do not consider it as absolutely exhausted;--I will not say now merely,
in the present improved state of the science, but as not exhausted
almost before philosophy began, in the rude consciousness of the
rudest savage, who saw, and remembered, and compared, and hoped, and
feared; and must, therefore, it is said, have known what it is to see,
and remember, and compare, and hope, and fear.
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