wolves, tigers, elephants, and other living creatures, which I include under those terms. The fallacy of conceiving consciousness to be something different from the feeling, which is said to be its object, has arisen, in a great measure, from the use of the personal pronoun _I_, which the conviction of our _identity_, during the various feelings, or temporary consciousnesses of different moments, has led us to employ, as significant of our permanent _self_, of that being, which is conscious, and variously conscious, and which continues, after these feelings have ceased, to be the subject of other consciousness, as transient as the former. I am conscious of a certain feeling, really means, however, no more than this--I feel in a certain manner, or, in other words, my mind exists in that state which constitutes a certain feeling; the mere existence of that feeling, and not any additional and distinguishable feeling that is to be termed _consciousness_, being all which is essential to the state of my mind, at the particular moment of sensation; for a pleasure, or pain, of which we are not conscious, is a pleasure or pain, that, in reference to us at least, has no existence. But when we say, I am conscious of a particular feeling, in the usual paraphrastic phraseology of our language, which has no mode of expressing, in a single word, the mere existence of a feeling, we are apt, from a prejudice of grammar, to separate the sentient I and the feeling as different,--not different, as they really are, merely in this respect, that the _feeling_ is one momentary and changeable state of the permanent substance _I_, that is, capable of existing also, at other moments, in other states,--but so _radically_ different, as to justify our classing the feeling, in the relation of an object, to that sentient principle which we call _I_,--and an object to it, not in retrospect only, as when the feeling is remembered, or when it is viewed in relation to other remembered feelings,--but in the very moment of the primary sensation itself; as if there could truly be two distinct states of the same mind, at that same moment, one of which states is to be termed _sensation_, and the other different state of the same mind to be termed _consciousness_.