Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
That a superficial view of matter, as it presents itself to our mere
organs of sense, should lead us to form a different opinion, is,
however, what might readily be supposed, because the analogies, which
that superficial view presents, are of a kind that seem to mark a loss
of identity whenever the state itself is altered.
In experimental philosophy, and in the obvious natural phenomena of
the material world, whenever a body changes its state, some addition
or separation has previously taken place. Thus, water becomes steam
by the addition, and it becomes ice by the loss, of a portion of that
matter of heat which is termed by chemists _caloric_; which loss and
addition are, of course, inconsistent with the notion of absolute
numerical identity of the corpuscles, in the three states of water as
a solid, a liquid, and a gaseous vapour. _Perception_, by which the
mind is metaphorically said to acquire knowledge, and _forgetfulness_,
by which it is metaphorically said to lose knowledge, have, it must be
confessed, a very striking analogy to these processes of corpuscular
loss and gain; and, since absolute identity _seems_ to be inconsistent
with a change of state in the one set of phenomena, with which we are
constantly familiar, we find difficulty in persuading ourselves, that
it is not inconsistent with a change of state in the other set also.
It is a difficulty of the same kind as that which every one must
have felt, when he learned, for the first time, the simple physical
law, that matter is indifferent as to the states of motion and rest,
and that it requires, therefore, as much force to destroy completely
the motion of a body, as to give it that motion when at rest. We have
not been accustomed to take into account the effects of _friction_,
and of atmospherical resistance, in gradually destroying, without the
interference of any visible force, the motion of a ball, which we are
conscious of effort in rolling from our hand; and we think, therefore,
that rest is the natural state of a body, and that it is the very
nature of motion to cease spontaneously. “Dediscet animus sero, quod
dedicit diu.” It is a very just saying of a French writer, that “it is
not easy to persuade men to put their _reason_ in the place of their
_eyes_; and that when, for example, after a thousand proofs, they are
reasonable enough to do their best to believe, that the planets are so
many opaque, solid, habitable orbs, like our earth, they do not believe
it in the same manner as they would have done if they had never looked
upon them in another light. There still comes back upon their belief
something of the first notion which they had, that clings to them with
an obstinacy, which it requires a continual effort to shake off.”[49]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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