in themselves opposite;--for, as far as we understand the phrase, it expresses nothing more than the invariableness of the simple fact, that in certain circumstances of relative position, bodies have a tendency to fly off from each other, as in certain other circumstances of relative position, which constitute the phenomena of gravitation, they have a tendency to approach. Whatever term we may employ to denote it, it is still a physical fact, that at a certain point of near and seemingly close approach of another mass, a body which was before in a state of rest, acquires immediately a tendency to fly off in different directions, and with different velocities at different times, and consequently, that, if the tendency to begin or to continue motion, in one direction, and with one velocity, be a state different from that which constitutes the tendency to begin or to continue motion in another direction, and with another velocity, the ball B, in these different circumstances, however identical it may be in substance, exists in two different states;--or all states, however different, may be said to be the same. It may be admitted, then, that the _feeling of rapture_ is a state of mind, completely different from that which constitutes the _feeling of agony_,--that the sensation of the fragrance of a rose, has no resemblance to our conception of a sphere or of an equilateral triangle,--and that, in general, all those thoughts and emotions, which,--more truly than the mere union of the immortal spirit within us with the body which it animates,--may be said to constitute _life_, “Love, Hope, and Joy, fair Pleasure's smiling train,-- Hate, Fear, and Grief, the family of Pain;” these, as they prevail, in different hours, render the same individual mind more unlike to itself, if its states or tendencies alone, and not its substantial identity be considered, than the minds perhaps of any two human beings, at the same moment. But still, as we have seen, even from the analogy of the material world,--which was supposed to furnish a powerful objection, it is no argument against the absolute identity of the mind, that exists in different states, however opposite, any more, than it is an argument against the absolute identity of a body, that it, at one moment, has a tendency to one particular motion,--at another moment a tendency to a different motion,--and at another moment, no tendency whatever to motion of any kind; since, in all these cases, as much as in the varying affections of the mind, there is a _change of state_, with absolute _identity of substance_. FOOTNOTES: [49] Fontenelle, Pluralité des Mondes, Conversat. 6me. [50] Gulliver's Travels, part ii. chap. 3. LECTURE XV. CONSIDERATION OF THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST MENTAL IDENTITY, CONTINUED; OPINION OF MR LOCKE RESPECTING IDENTITY; SOURCE OF HIS PARADOX ON THIS SUBJECT; AND REFLECTIONS SUGGESTED BY IT.