Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
I cannot quit the subject of identity, however,--though from my belief
of its importance, I may already, perhaps, have dwelt upon it too
long,--without giving you some slight account of the very strange
opinions of Mr Locke on the subject. I do this, both because some
notice is due, to the paradoxes,--even though they be erroneous,--of
so illustrious a man, and because I conceive it to be of great
advantage, to point out to you occasionally the illusions, which have
been able to obscure the discernment of those _bright_ spirits, which
nature sometimes, though sparingly, grants, to adorn at least that
intellectual gloom, which even they cannot irradiate; that, in their
path of glory, seem to move along the heavens by their own independent
light, as if almost unconscious of the darkness below, but cannot
exist there for a moment, without shedding, on the feeble and doubtful
throngs beneath, some faint beams of their own incommunicable lustre.
It is chiefly, as connected with these eminent names, that fallacy
itself becomes instructive, when simply exhibited,--if this only be
done, not from any wish to disparage merits, that are far above the
impotence of such attempts, but with all the veneration which is due
to human excellence, united as it must ever be to human imperfection,
“Even the errors of great men,” it has been said, “are fruitful of
truths;” and, though they were to be attended with no other advantage,
this one at least they must always have, that they teach us how very
possible it is for man to err; thus lessening at once our tendency to
slavish acquiescence in the unexamined opinions of others, and--which
is much harder to be done--lessening also, as much as it is possible
for any thing to lessen, the strong conviction, which we feel, that we
are ourselves unerring.--The first and most instructive lesson, which
man can receive, when he is capable of reflection, is to _think for
himself_; the second, without which the first would be comparatively of
little value, is to reject, in _himself_, that infallibility, which he
rejects in _others_.
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