Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
It is as _signs_, indeed, far more than as mere pleasures in
themselves, that our sensations are to us of such inestimable value.
Even in the case to which I before alluded, of the symbolic or
arbitrary characters of a language, when we consider all the important
purposes to which these are subservient, as raising us originally from
absolute barbarism, and saving us from relapsing into it, there might
be an appearance of paradox, indeed, but there would be perfect truth
in asserting, that the sensations which are themselves indifferent,
are more precious, even in relation to happiness itself, than the
sensations which are themselves accompanied with lively delight, or
rather, of which it is the very essence to be delightful. Happiness,
though necessarily involving present pleasure, is the direct or
indirect, and often the very distant result of feelings of every
kind, pleasurable, painful, and indifferent. It is like the beautiful
profusion of flowers, which adorn our summer fields. In our admiration
of the foliage, and the blossoms, and the pure airs and sunshine, in
which they seem to live, we almost forget the darkness of the soil in
which their roots are spread. Yet how much should we err, if we were
to consider them as deriving their chief nutriment from the beams that
shine around them, in the warmth and light of which we have wandered
with joy. That delightful radiance alone would have been of little
efficacy, without the showers, from which, in those very wanderings, we
have often sought shelter at noon; or at least without the dews, which
were unheeded by us, as they fell silently and almost insensibly on our
evening walk.
With the common division of our sensations into five classes,--those
of smell, taste, hearing, sight, touch, we have been familiar, almost
from our childhood; and though the classification may be far from
perfect, in reference to our sensations themselves, considered simply
as affections of the mind, it is sufficiently accurate, in reference
to the mere organs of sense; for, though our sensations of _heat_
and _cold_, in one very important respect, which is afterwards to be
considered by us, have much less resemblance to the other sensations
which we acquire by our organs of touch, or at least to sensations,
which we are generally supposed to derive from that organ, than to
sensations, which we receive by the medium of other organs, our
sensations of smell and sound for example--still, as they arise from an
affection of the same organ, they may be more conveniently referred to
the same, than to any other class; since, if we quit that obvious line
of distinction, which the difference of organs affords, we shall not
find it easy to define them by other lines as precise.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account