In the elucidation of these, my great object was to show, that there is nothing, in the mere states of mind, that constitutes the sensations of fragrance, sweetness, sound, which could have led us to ascribe them to corporeal objects as their causes,--more than in any of our internal joys or sorrows,--if we had had no other means of acquiring knowledge of those causes, than are afforded by the sensations themselves,--that, in short, we consider them as sensations, or external affections of the mind, because we have previously believed in an external world,--not that we believe in an external world, merely because we have had those particular sensations. The various advantages, which these three senses afford, I endeavoured to point out to you; and, in particular occupied a great part of my Lecture, in illustrating the advantages for which we are indebted to our organ of _hearing_, as the medium of _language_, and by it, more or less directly, not of the high acquisitions of science and civilization only, but of the rudest forms of social communication, and almost of social existence. After the remarks on this advantage received from _language_, which is unquestionably, and beyond all comparison, the most inestimable benefit which the sense of hearing affords,--it would be improper to omit wholly the mention of the pleasure, which we receive from it, as a source of _musical_ delight,--of that expression of feeling, which itself, almost like verbal discourse, may be said to be a language, since it is the utterance of thought and emotion from heart to heart,--but which has a voice, as independent of the mere arbitrary _forms of speech_, as the tears of gratitude, or the smiles of love, that may indeed, give eloquence to _words_, but require no _words_ to render _them_ eloquent. Though, when very strictly considered, even the pure, and almost spiritual delight of music, may perhaps be counted only a pleasure of sense, it yet approaches, by so many striking analogies, to the nature of our intellectual enjoyments, that it may almost be said to belong to that class; and though,--relatively to minds that are capable of enjoyments more truly intellectual,--it is to be considered as a mere pastime or relaxation, it assumes a far higher character, in its relation to the general pleasures of common minds, and may be said, at least, to be the _intellectual luxury_ of those, who are incapable of any other luxury, that deserves so honourable a name. And it is well, that there should be some intermediate pleasure of this sort, to withdraw for a while the dull and the sensual, from the grosser existence in which they may be sunk, and to give them some glimpses, at least, of a state of purer enjoyment, than that which is to be derived from the sordid gains, and sordid luxuries, of common life.