Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
_What_, then, is truly meant, when it is said, that, for producing the
mental affection, which constitutes hearing, some previous vibration
is necessary? It certainly cannot mean, as I have already remarked,
that the vibration is any thing in itself different from the series
of physical events which it expresses, however few or numerous these
may be, since it is only the name which we give to them, when we
consider them together; nor can it mean that the direct cause of the
sensation is any thing different from the one organic state immediately
preceding the sensation,--a state which may, indeed, have resulted from
a long sequence of prior organic states, produced during the continued
vibratory motion of the air, but which is itself, in its relation to
the phenomenon which succeeds it,--that affection of the sentient
mind which constitutes _hearing_,--to be considered independently of
these prior states, that have no other relation to the mind, than as
gradually inducing that ultimate organic state, which is the state that
is followed by sensation. There is a part, less or greater, of the
sensorial organ, which must be affected, in a certain manner, before
the sensation of hearing can take place; and, in _vibration_, there
is nothing but a repeated approach and secession of the vibrating
particles. If _vibration_, then, or a series of pulses, be necessary,
it is evident that a corresponding series of changes in the organ
is necessary; that is to say, there is no one instant, at which the
vibrating particles are in such a state relatively to the sensorial
organ, that if no previous change had been excited in the organ itself,
they could have produced in it immediately, the precise state, which
is instantly followed by the mental affection of hearing. There must,
therefore, be a _series_ of changes, in the sensorial organ itself,
the last of which only is followed by sensation. The particles of the
air, or any other elastic medium, for example, must, in their _first_
appulse, produce a certain state of the sensorial organ; in their
_second_ appulse, a different state, by acting on an organ, already
affected in a certain manner; in their _third_ appulse, a still
different state; and thus successively, till, _at last_, they produce
that particular definite state of the sensorial organ, in consequence
of which, the _mind_ becomes instantly _sentient_,--a state which could
not have been produced by any single impulse of the particles on the
unaffected organ, because then vibration, or a series of pulses, would
not have been necessary.
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