Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
capable of distinguishing tones as very dissimilar, the differences of
which, however obvious at present, we should scarcely, but for such
original attentive discrimination, have been able to detect. What, in
comparison, the refined musical ear of a performer,--almost every hour,
and every moment, of whose life has been spent amid sounds,
“Untwisting all the chains, that tie
The hidden soul of harmony,”--
is to a common musical ear, that common musical ear may be to those
in whom this discriminating skill seems to be wholly or nearly
defective. The refined musician,--who, but for the long practice of
his art, would have shared that incapacity which now excites his
wonder,--is astonished, that persons of common ear do not distinguish
the nice differences which appear to him almost as remarkable as those
differences which they are capable of perceiving; and the person of
common musical ear only does the same thing, when he is astonished that
the less refined differences, remarked by himself, are not obviously
distinguishable by all mankind, or, at least, by all who have no
deafness to incapacitate them from hearing the separate sounds. The
discrimination in both has depended on previous attention, which has
necessarily been greater in one case than in the other; and what
attention can we suppose to have been originally given, if from the
cause which I have ventured to state as a possible one in persons
without musical ear, no pleasure had originally been felt by them in
any sequence of notes as successive, and the whole value of sound
been to them the meaning of which it was symbolically representative,
which, accordingly, they have learned to discriminate in every case, as
accurately as others.
I might follow out this speculation at much greater length; but I have
already dwelt too long on what is at best a conjecture, and what,
perhaps, even as a mere conjecture, is founded only on a slight analogy.
After the examination of the phenomena of _Smell_, _Taste_, and
_Hearing_, which are peculiarly simple, I proceed to the consideration
of Senses, which afford phenomena that are more complicated, or, at
least, which seem more complicated, as considered in the mature state
of the mind; when the sensations that arise from one set of organs,
by frequent co-existence with sensations that arise from affections
of other sets of organs, are, as it were, blended with them in one
compound perception, and so permanently modified forever after, that
it is difficult in all cases, and in many cases perhaps impossible, to
form any accurate notion of the sensations as they existed in their
original elementary state.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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