Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
I must remark, however, that I should not have thought it necessary,
thus to direct so much of your attention to the principles of
scientific inquiry in general, if I could have taken for granted,
that you had already enjoyed the benefit of the instruction of my
illustrious colleague in another Chair, whose Lectures on Natural
Philosophy, exemplifying that soundness of inquiry, which I can only
recommend, would, in that case, have enlightened you more, as to the
principles of physical investigation, than any mere rules, of which it
is possible to point out to you the utility and the excellence.
All physical science, whatever may be the variety of objects, mental or
material, to which it is directed, is nothing more than the comparison
of phenomena, and the discovery of their agreement or disagreement,
or order of succession. It is on _observation_, therefore, or on
consciousness, which is only another name for _internal_ observation,
that the whole of science is founded; because there can be no
comparison, without observation of the phenomena compared, and no
discovery of agreement or disagreement, without comparison. So far,
then, as man has observed the phenomena of matter or of mind, so far,
and no farther, may he infer, with confidence, the properties of
matter and of mind; or, in the words of the great primary aphorism of
Lord Bacon, which has been so often quoted, and so often quoted in
vain, “Homo, naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit,
quantum de naturæ ordine re vel mente observaverit; nec amplius scit
aut potest.”[21]
What is it that we truly mean, however, when we say, that we are
about to inquire into the nature and properties of any substance? The
question is a most important one, and is far from being so simple as
it may at first appear. From the mere misunderstanding of the import
of this question, the brightest talents of a long succession of
ages,--talents, which, with clearer views of _this single point_, might
have anticipated all the discoveries of our own time, and introduced
us, perhaps, to discoveries still more brilliant and astonishing, were
wasted in inquiries as barren as the frivolous glory which attended
them,--that produced indeed much contention, and more pride, but
produced nothing more; and, without giving any additional knowledge,
took away from ignorance only its humility, and its power of being
instructed.
What is it that we truly have in view, or should have in view, when we
inquire into the nature of a substance?
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