Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
for those who have read and understood that work, is chiefly for the
sake of those who may not have had an opportunity of perusing the
volume itself.
One source of the general fallacy unquestionably is that influence
of _abstraction_, to which I before alluded, as aided, and in a
great measure perpetuated, by the use of language, and the common
unavoidable modes of grammatical construction. We speak of the powers
of a substance, of substances that have certain power--of the figure
of a body, or of bodies that have a certain figure, in the same manner
as we speak of the students of a university, or of a house that has
a great number of lodgers; and we thus learn to consider the power,
which a substance possesses, as something different from the substance
itself, inherent in it indeed, but inherent, as something that may yet
subsist separately. In the ancient philosophy, this error extended to
the notions both of form and power. In the case of _form_, however, we
have seen, that the illusion, though it lasted for many ages, did at
length cease, and that no one now regards the _figure_ of a body, as
any thing but the body itself. It is probable that the illusion, with
respect to power, as something different from the substance that is
said to possess it, would, in like manner, have ceased, and given place
to juster views, if it had not been for the cause, which I am next to
consider.
This cause is the _imperfection of our senses_, the same cause which,
in the other department of physics before examined by us,--the
department, that relates to matter considered merely as existing
in space,--we find to give occasion to all our inquiries into the
compositions of bodies. In this department of physics, however, which
relates to the successions of phenomena in time, the imperfection of
our senses operates in a different way. It is not that which gives
occasion to the necessity of inquiry; for we have seen, that senses,
of the utmost accuracy and delicacy, could not, of themselves, and
without experience, have enabled us to predict any one event, in the
innumerable series of phenomena that are constantly taking place
around us. But, though senses of the nicest discrimination could not
have rendered inquiry into the successions of events superfluous, they
would have saved us from much idle inquiry, and have given far greater
precision, if not to our _rules_, at least to our uniform _practice_,
of philosophizing.
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