Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
88. Maine has pointed out (_Early History of Institutions_, Lecture
XIII.) that the great despotic empires of ancient times, excluding
the Roman, of which more shall be said directly, and modern empires
in the East were in the main tax-collecting institutions. They
exercise coercive force over their subjects of the most violent kind
for certain purposes at certain times, but they do not impose laws
as distinct from 'particular and occasional commands' nor do they
judicially administer or enforce a customary law. In a certain sense
the subjects render them habitual obedience, i.e. they habitually
submit when the agents of the empire descend on them for taxes and
recruits, but in the general tenor of their lives their actions and
forbearances are regulated by authorities with which the empire
never interferes,--with which probably it could not interfere
without destroying itself. These authorities can scarcely be said
to reside in a determinate person or persons at all, but, so far as
they do so, they reside mixedly in priests or exponents of customary
religion, in heads of families acting within the family, and in some
village-council acting beyond the limits of the family. Whether, in
such a state of things, we are to consider that there is a sovereign
power at all, and, if so, where it is to be considered to reside,
are chiefly questions of words. If complete uncontrolledness by a
stronger power is essential to sovereignty, the local authorities
just spoken of are not sovereign. The conquering despot could descend
on them and sweep them away, leaving anarchy in their place, and he
does compel them to be put in exercise for a particular purpose,
that of raising tribute or sometimes recruits. On the other hand,
these authorities, which represent a general will of the communities,
form the power which determines such actions and forbearances of the
individual as do not proceed from natural inclination. The military
ruler, indeed, is sovereign in the sense of possessing irresistible
coercive power, but in fact this power is only exercised within
narrow limits, and not at all in any legislative or judicial way. If
exercised beyond these limits and in conflict with customary law,
the result would be a general anarchy. The truest way of expressing
the state of the case is to say that, taking the term 'sovereign' in
the sense which we naturally associate with it, and in which it is
used by modern European writers on sovereignty, there is under such
conditions no sovereign, but that the practical regulation of life,
except during intervals of military violence and anarchy, rests with
authorities representing the general will, though these are to a
certain extent interfered with by an alien force.
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