Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
126. The objection to such a view would be that it represents the
state as a purely natural, not at all as a moral, organism. Moral
agency is not merely an agency by which an end is attained, or an
idea realised, or a function fulfilled, but an agency determined by
an idea on the part of the agent, by his conception of an end or
function; and the state would be brought into being and sustained
by merely natural, as opposed to moral, agency, unless there were
a consciousness of ends--and of ends the same in principle with
that served by the state itself--on the part of those by whom it is
brought into being, and sustained. I say 'ends the same in principle
with that served by the state itself,' because, if the state arose
out of the action of men determined, indeed, by the consciousness of
ends, but ends wholly heterogeneous to that realised by the state,
it would not be a moral institution, would not stand in any moral
relation to men. Now among the influences that have operated in the
formation of states, a large part, it must be admitted, are simply
natural. Such are the influences of climate, of distribution of
mountain and plain, land and water, &c, of all physical demarcations
and means of communication. But these, it is clear, are only organic
to the formation of states so far as, so to speak, they take a
character, which does not belong to them as merely natural, from
agencies distinctively human.
127. 'Human, if you like,' it may be replied, 'but not moral, if a
moral agency implies any reference to a social or human good, to a
good which the individual desires because it is good for others, or
for mankind, as well as himself. In the earth--hunger of conquering
hordes, in the passions of military despots, in the pride or avarice
or vindictiveness which moved such men as Louis XI or Henry VIII to
override the semi-anarchy of feudalism with a real sovereignty, what
is there of reference to such good? Yet if we suppose the influence
of such motives as these, together with the natural influences just
spoken of, to be erased from the history of the formation of states,
its distinguishing features are gone.'
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