Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
of affectionate ministrations arising out of family instincts and
memories; and that the right to have life protected corresponds to
this passive social function. The fact, however, that we have almost
to cast about in certain cases for an explanation of the established
belief in the sacredness of human life, shows how deeply rooted that
belief is unless where some counter-belief interferes with it.
155. On the other hand, it is equally noticeable that there are
counter-beliefs which, under conditions, do neutralise it, and that
certain other beliefs, which form its proper complement, have very
slight hold on the mind of modern Christendom. It is taken for
granted that the exigencies of the state in war, whether the war be
necessary or not for saving the state from dissolution, absolutely
neutralise the right to live. We are little influenced by the idea of
the universal brotherhood of men, of mankind as forming one society
with a common good, of which the conception may determine the action
of its members. In international dealings we are apt to suppose that
it can have no place at all. Yet, as has been pointed out, it is
the proper correlative of the admission of a right to free life as
belonging to man in virtue simply of his human nature. And though
this right can only be grounded on the capacity, which belongs to
the human nature, for freely fulfilling some function in the social
organism, we do very little to give reality to the capacity or to
enable it to realise itself. We content ourselves with enacting that
no man shall be used by other men as a means against his will, but we
leave it to be pretty much a matter of chance whether or no he shall
be qualified to fulfil any social function, to contribute anything to
the common good, and to do so freely (i.e. under the conception of a
common good). The only reason why a man should not be used by other
men simply as a means to their ends, is that he should use himself
as a means to an end which is really his and theirs at once. But
while we say that he shall not be used as a means, we often leave him
without the chance of using himself for any social end at all.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account