Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
good to mankind, have been really influenced by a desire for any
such good,--and much scepticism is justified in regard to such a
supposition,--then so much less of the guilt of the wrong-doing has
been theirs. No nation, at any rate, that has taken part in such wars
can fairly take credit for having been governed by such a motive. It
has been either a passive instrument in the hands of its rulers, or
has been animated by less worthy motives, very mixed, but of which
perhaps a diffused desire for excitement has been the most innocent.
On what reasonable ground can Englishmen or Germans or Russians claim
that their several nations took part in the wars by which India was
pacified, Germany unified, Bulgaria liberated, under the dominant
influence of a desire for human good? Rather, if the action of a
national conscience in such matters is possible at all, they should
take shame for their share in that general human selfishness which
rendered certain conditions of human development only attainable by
such means.
166. (2) Reverting then to the questions which arose [1] out of the
assertion of a right to free life on the part of the individual man
as such, it appears that the first must be answered in the negative.
No state of war can make the destruction of man's life by man other
than a wrong, though the wrong is not always chargeable upon all the
parties to a war. The second question is virtually answered by what
has been said about the first. In regard to the state according to
its idea the question could not arise, for according to its idea
the state is an institution in which all rights are harmoniously
maintained, in which all the capacities that give rise to rights have
free-play given to them. No action in its own interest of a state
that fulfilled this idea could conflict with any true interest or
right of general society, of the men not subject to its law taken as
a whole. There is no such thing as an inevitable conflict between
states. There is nothing in the nature of the state that, given a
multiplicity of states, should make the gain of the one the loss of
the other. The more perfectly each one of them attains its proper
object of giving free scope to the capacities of all persons living
on a certain range of territory, the easier it is for others to
do so; and in proportion as they all do so the danger of conflict
disappears.
[1] [Above, sec. 156. RLN]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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