Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
201. What then is the general ground of distinction between those
with which terror does, and those with which it does not, need to
be associated? Clearly it is purposeless to associate terror with
breaches of right in the case where the breaker does not know that
he is violating a right, and is not responsible for not knowing it.
No association of terror with such a breach of right can prevent men
from similar breaches under like conditions. In any case, therefore,
in which it is, to begin with, open to dispute whether a breach of
right has been committed at all, e.g. when it is a question whether
a contract has been really broken, owing to some doubt as to the
interpretation of the contract or its application to a particular
set of circumstances, or whether a commodity of which someone is
in possession properly belongs to another,--in such a case, though
the judge finally decides that there has been a breach of right,
there is no ground for treating it as a crime or punishing it. If,
in the course of judicial inquiry, it turns out that there has been
fraud by one or other of the parties to the litigation, a criminal
prosecution, having punishment, not redress, for its object, should
properly supervene upon the civil suit, unless the consequences of
the civil suit are incidentally such as to amount to a sufficient
punishment of the fraudulent party. Again, it is purposeless to
associate terror with a breach of obligation which the person
committing it knows to be a breach, but of an obligation which he has
no means of fulfilling, e.g. non-payment of an acknowledged debt by
a man who, through no fault of his own, is without means of paying
it. It is only in cases of one or other of the above kinds,--cases
in which the breach of right, supposing it to have been committed,
has presumably arisen either from inability to prevent it or from
ignorance of the existence of the right,--that it can be held as an
absolute rule to be no business of the state to interfere penally but
only in the way of restoring, so far as possible, the broken right.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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