Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
251. For the convenience of analysis, we may treat the obligations
correlative to rights, obligations which it is the proper office of
law to enforce, apart from moral duties and from the virtues which
are tendencies to fulfil those duties. I am properly _obliged_ to
those actions and forbearances which are necessary to the general
freedom, necessary if each is not to interfere with the realisation
of another's will. My _duty_ is to be interested positively in my
neighbour's well-being. And it is important to understand that,
while the enforcement of obligations is possible, that of moral
duties is impossible. But the establishment of obligations by law or
authoritative custom, and the gradual recognition of moral duties,
have not been separate processes They have gone on together in the
history of man. The growth of the institutions by which more complete
equality of rights is gradually secured to a wider range of persons,
and of those interests in various forms of social well-being by
which the will is moralised, have been related to each other as the
outer and inner side of the same spiritual development, though at a
certain stage of reflection it comes to be discovered that the agency
of force, by which the rights are maintained, is ineffectual for
eliciting the moral interests. The result of the twofold process has
been the creation of the actual content of morality; the articulation
of the indefinite consciousness that there is something that should
be--a true well-being to be aimed at other than any pleasure or
succession of pleasures--into the sentiments and interests which
form an 'enlightened conscience.' It is thus that when the highest
stage of reflective morality is reached, and upon interests in this
or that mode of social good there supervenes an interest in an ideal
of goodness, that ideal has already a definite filling; and the man
who pursues duty for duty's sake, who does good for the sake of being
good or in order to realise an idea of perfection, is at no loss to
say what in particular his duty is, or by what particular methods the
perfection of character is to be approached.
SUPPLEMENT.
_Some Quotations rendered into English._
From Sect. 32. _Tractatus Politici_, II. 4 ('Per jus itaque'). 'By
right of nature (natural right) I understand ... the actual power of
nature.' 'Whatever an individual man does by the laws of his nature,
that he does with the highest natural right, and his right towards
nature goes just as far as his power holds out.'
'Jus naturae' = 'natural right.' 'Potentia' = 'power.' 'Jus' =
'right.' 'Jus humanum' = 'right of man,' or 'right _qua_ human.'
_Ib_. II. 5 ('Homines magis'). 'Human beings are led more by blind
desire than by reason; and hence their natural power or right should
be marked out not by reason but by any inclination by which they
are determined to act, and by which they endeavour after their own
preservation.'
'Jus civile' = 'civic right or law.'
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