Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
39. It was because Plato and Aristotle conceived the life of the
πόλις [1] so clearly as the τέλος of the individual, relation to
which makes him what he is--the relation in the case of the πολίτης
proper being a conscious or recognised relation--that they laid the
foundation for all true theory of 'rights.' It is true that they have
not even a word for 'rights.' The claims which in modern times have
been advanced on behalf of the individual against the state under
the designation 'natural rights' are most alien from their way of
thinking. But in saying that the πόλις was a 'natural' institution
and that man was φύσει πολιτικός, Aristotle, according to the sense
which he attached to πόλις, was asserting the doctrine of 'natural
rights' in the only sense in which it is true. He regards the state
(πόλις) as a society of which the life is maintained by what its
members do for the sake of maintaining it, by functions consciously
fulfilled with reference to that end, and which in that sense imposes
duties; and at the same time as a society from which its members
derive the ability, through education and protection, to fulfil their
several functions, and which in that sense confers rights. It is thus
that the πολίτης μετέχει τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι. Man, being
φύσει πολίτης,--being already in respect of capacities and tendencies
a member of such a society, existing only in κοινωνίαι which contain
its elements,--has 'naturally' the correlative duties and rights
which the state imposes and confers. Practically it is only the Greek
man that Aristotle regards as φύσει πολίτης, but the Greek conception
of citizenship once established was applicable to all men capable of
a common interest. This way of conceiving the case, however, depends
on the 'teleological' view of man and the forms of society in which
he is found to live, i.e. on the view of men as being what they are
in virtue of non-sensible functions, and of certain forms of life
determined by relation to more perfect forms which they have the
capacity or tendency to become.
[1] [Greek πόλις (polis) = city, τέλος (telos) = end or purpose,
πολίτης (polites) = citizen, φύσει πολίτης or φύσει πολιτικός (physei
polites or politikos) = social or a citizen by nature, πολίτης
μετέχει τοῦ ἄρχειν καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι (polites metechei tou archein kai
tou archesthai) = a citizen by turns rules and is ruled, κοινωνίαι
(koinoniai) = associations. Tr]
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