Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
42. All the more fruitful elements in Spinoza's political doctrine
are lacking in that of Hobbes, but the principle of the two theories
is very much the same. Each begins with the supposition of an
existence of human individuals, unaffected by society, and each
struggling for existence against the rest, so that men are 'natura
hostes.' Each conceives 'jus naturale' as = 'potentia naturalis.'
But Spinoza carries out this conception much more consistently. He
does not consider that the natural right, which is might, ceases to
exist or becomes anything else when a multitude combine their natural
rights or mights in an 'imperium.' If the ostensible 'imperium' comes
into collision with the powers of individuals, single or combined,
among those who have hitherto been subject to it, and proves the
weaker, it _ipso facto_ ceases to be an 'imperium.' Not having
superior power, it no longer has superior right to the 'subditi.'
It is on this principle, as we have seen, that he deals with the
question of limitations to the right of a sovereign. Its rights are
limited because its powers are so. Exercised in certain ways and
directions they defeat themselves. Thus as he puts it in _Epist_.
L. (where he points out his difference from Hobbes), 'Supremo
magistratui in qualibet urbe non plus in subditos juris, quam juxta
mensuram potestatis, qua subditum superat, competere statuo.' Hobbes,
on the other hand, supposes his sovereign power to have an absolute
right to the submission of all its subjects, singly or collectively,
irrespectively of the question of its actual power against them. This
right he considers it to derive from a covenant by which individuals,
weary of the state of war, have agreed to devolve their 'personae,'
in the language of Roman law, upon some individual or collection
of individuals, which is henceforward to represent them, and to be
considered as acting with, their combined powers. This covenant being
in the nature of the case irrevocable, the sovereign derives from it
an indefeasible right to direct the actions of all members of the
society over which it is sovereign.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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