Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
58. As to the second point, from his own conception of what men
are in the state of nature, and of the ends for which they found
political societies, Locke derives certain necessary limitations
of what the supreme power in a commonwealth may rightfully do. The
prime business of the political society, once formed, is to establish
the legislative power. This is 'sacred and unalterable in the hands
where the community have once placed it' (_Civ. Gov_. XI. Sect. 134);
'unalterable,' that is, as we gather from the sequel, by anything
short of an act of the community which originally placed it in these
hands. But as men in a state of nature have 'no arbitrary power' over
each other (which must mean that according to the 'law of nature'
they have no such power), so they cannot transfer any such power to
the community nor it to the legislature. No legislature can have the
right to destroy, enslave, or designedly impoverish the subjects. And
as no legislature can be entitled to do anything which the individual
in the state of nature would not by the law of nature be entitled to
do, so its great business is to declare the law of nature in general
terms and administer it by known authorised judges. The state of
nature, Locke seemed to think, would have done very well, but for
the inconvenience of every man being judge in his own case of what
the law of nature requires. It is to remedy this inconvenience by
establishing (1) a settled law, received by common consent, (2) a
known and indifferent judge, (3) a power to enforce the decisions of
such a judge, that political society is formed.
Hence a legislature violates the 'trust that is put in it' by society
unless it observes the following rules: (1) it is to govern 'by
promulgated established laws,' not to be varied to suit particular
interests; (2) these laws are to be designed only for the good of
the people; (3) it must not raise taxes but by consent of the people
through themselves or their deputies; (4) it neither 'must, nor
can, transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have' (_Civ. Gov_. XI. Sect. 142).
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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