Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
an act of the whole people governed--is one
which, anywhere except in a Swiss canton, it would be impossible
to fulfil. For practical purposes, Locke comes to a right result
by ignoring this impossibility. Having supposed the reality of one
impossible event,--the establishment of government by compact or
by the act of a society founded on compact,--he cancels this error
in the result by supposing the possibility of another transaction
equally impossible, viz, the collective act of a people dissolving
its government.
[1] [Greek παρέκβασις (parekbasis) = a government without a proper
basis Tr]
63. It is evident from the chapter (XIX.) on the 'dissolution of
government' that he did not seriously contemplate the conditions
under which such an act could be exercised. What he was really
concerned about was to dispute 'the right divine to govern wrong'
on the part of a legislative as much as on the part of an executive
power; to maintain the principle that government is only justified
by being for the good of the people, and to point out the difference
between holding that some government is necessarily for the good of
the people, and holding that any particular government is for their
good, a difference which Hobbes had ignored. In order to do this,
starting with the supposition of an actual deed on the part of a
community establishing a government, he had to suppose a reserved
right on the part of the community by a like deed to dissolve
it. But in the only particular case in which he contemplates a
loss by the legislature of its representative character, he does
not suggest the establishment of another by an act of the whole
people. He saw that the English Parliament in his time could not
claim to be such as it could be supposed that the covenanting
community originally intended it to be. 'It often comes to pass,'
he says, 'in governments where part of the legislative consists of
representatives chosen by the people, that in tract of time this
representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the
reasons it was first established upon.... The bare name of a town,
of which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so
much housing as a sheepcote, or more inhabitants than a shepherd is
to be found, sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of
law-makers, as a whole county, numerous in people, and powerful in
riches. This strangers stand amazed at, and everyone must confess
needs a remedy; though most think it hard to find one, because the
constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act
of the society antecedent to all positive laws in it, and depending
wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter it. And therefore
the people, when the legislative is once constituted, having, in such
a government as we have been speaking of, no power to act as long as
the government stands, this inconvenience is thought incapable of a
remedy' (Chapter XIII. Sect. 157). The only remedy which he suggests
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