Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
66. The 'problem of which the social contract is a solution' Rousseau
states thus: 'To find a form of association which protects with the
whole common force the person and property of each associate, and in
virtue of which everyone, while uniting himself to all, only obeys
himself and remains as free as before.' (_Contrat Social_, I, vi.)
The terms of the contract which solves this problem Rousseau states
thus: 'Each of us throws into the common stock his person and all
his faculties under the supreme direction of the general will; and
we accept each member as an individual part of the whole.... There
results from this act of association, in place of the several persons
of the several contracting parties, a collective moral body, composed
of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which body
receives from this act its unity, its common self, its life, and its
will.... It is called by its members a _state_ when it is passive, a
_sovereign_ when it is active, a _power_ when compared with similar
bodies. The associates are called collectively a _people_, severally
_citizens_ as sharing in the sovereign authority, _subjects_ as
submitted to the laws of the state.' (_Ib_.) Each of them is under
an obligation in two relations, 'as a member of the sovereign body
towards the individuals, and as a member of the state towards the
sovereign.' All the subjects can by a public vote be placed under a
particular obligation towards the sovereign, but the sovereign cannot
thus incur an obligation towards itself. It cannot impose any law
upon itself which it cannot cancel. Nor is there need to restrict
its powers in the interest of the subjects. For the sovereign body,
being formed only of the individuals which constitute it, can have no
interest contrary to theirs. 'From the mere fact of its existence,
it is always all that it ought to be' (since, from the very fact of
its institution, all merely private interests are lost in it). On
the other hand, the will of the individual (his particular interest
as founded upon his particular desires) may very well conflict with
that general will which constitutes the sovereign. Hence the social
pact necessarily involves a tacit agreement, that anyone refusing to
conform to the general will shall be forced to do so by the whole
body politic; in other words, 'shall be forced to be free,' since the
universal conformity to the general will is the guarantee to each
individual of freedom from dependence on any other person or persons.
(I, vii.)
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