[49] 21 Henry VIII., c. 8. [50] 64 Chamber’s Journal, p. 515. [51] 26 Henry VIII. [52] 21 James I., c. 28. [53] 8 & 9 William IV., c. 26. [54] Richard III., Act III., Scene I. For discussion of this and other references in Shakespeare, to the Law of Sanctuary, see White’s “Law in Shakespeare,” Sec. 324, p. 354. [55] Act IV., Scene I. [56] 3’ Henry VI., Act IV., Scene IV. [57] Act I., Scene X. CHAPTER X. ANCIENT PUNISHMENTS. In the broader sense, punishment includes any pain or detriment suffered in consequence of wrong-doing, but as treated of in this chapter, it means the pain or other penalty imposed by an authority to which the offender is subject, for a crime or offense committed. The term punishment is properly restricted to the penalties imposed by competent authority, for violations of law; but as the subject of the following pages will bear evidence, it has been frequently imposed upon the weak and the innocent, as well as upon the guilty, and instead of being always confined to the authority acting only in pursuance of the fixed rules of law, it has too often resulted from the arbitrary will of someone in superior authority. “Man’s inhumanity to man” seems ever to have been a peculiar trait of the species and human cruelty exceeds that of all other animals, in the same proportion that man excels the lower species. In following the bent of his cruel impulses, man has never rect’ with good or ill, but like a ravenous beast of prey, far fiercer “than the wolf or bear, he slays his kind in cruel glee and sorrows he can slay no more.” When we read the history of the punishments of antiquity, we can but wonder that the people suffered so long and so continuously as a result of laws which had for their foundation the passions or wickedness of only a small per cent of the people, instead of the beneficent rules of conduct formulated by the “cool examiner of human nature,” familiar with the actions of the multitude and prompted by altruistic motives, to legislate for the greatest happiness of the greater number. Every just punishment should be limited to the necessity of defending and preserving the liberty of the masses of society from the usurpations and wrongs of individuals, hence, every punishment which does not arise from such necessity is tyranny.[1]