Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical ExpositionDewey, John
Philosophy
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
Dewey, John
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
"Our reasonings are based on two leading principles,--that of
contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false all which contains
contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to that
which is false; and that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we
judge that no fact is true or actual, no proposition veritable, unless
there is a sufficient reason why it is as it is, and not otherwise,
although these reasons are generally unknown to us. Thus there are
two sorts of truths,--those of reason, and those of fact. The truths
of reason are necessary, and their opposites impossible; while those
of fact are contingent, and their opposites possible. When a truth
is necessary, its reason can be discovered by analysis, resolving
it into ideas and truths that are simpler, until the primitive
truths are arrived at. It is thus that the mathematicians proceed in
reducing by analysis the theorems of speculation and the canons of
practice into definitions, axioms, and postulates. Thus they come to
simple ideas whose definition cannot be given; primitive truths that
cannot be proved, and which do not need it, since they are identical
propositions, whose opposite contains a manifest contradiction."
"But in contingent truths--those of fact--the sufficient reason must
be found; namely, in the succession of things which fill the created
universe,--for otherwise the analysis into particular reasons would
go into detail without limit, by reason of the immense variety of
natural things, and of the infinite divisibility of bodies. There
are an infinity of figures and of past and present movements which
enter into the efficient cause of my present writing, and there are
an infinity of minute inclinations and dispositions of my soul which
enter into its final cause. And since all this detail contains only
other contingent and particular antecedents, each of which has need
of a similar analysis to account for it, we really make no progress by
this analysis; and it is necessary that the final or sufficient reason
be outside the endless succession or series of contingent particulars,
that it consist in a necessary being, in which this series of changes
is contained only _eminenter_, as in its source. This necessary being
and source is what we call God."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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