They appear to be all alike, as modes of the one comprehensive substance. Here we have the universal, or "identity," side of Leibniz's philosophy pushed to its logical outcome,--the doctrine of pantheism. His third doctrine of God is really a unity of the two previous. It is the doctrine that God is the harmony of the monads,--neither one among them nor one made up of them, but their organic unity. This doctrine is nowhere expressly stated in words (unless it be when he says that "God alone constitutes the relation and community of substances"), but it runs through his whole system. According to this, God _is_ the pre-established harmony. This conception, like that of harmony, may have either a mechanical interpretation (according to which God is the artificial, external point of contact of intelligence and reality, in themselves opposed) or an organic meaning, according to which God _is_ the unity of intelligence and reality. On this interpretation alone does the saying that God is the only immediate object of the monads have sense. It simply states that the apparent dualism between intelligence and its object which is found in the world is overcome in God; that the distinction between them is not the ultimate fact, but exists in and for the sake of a unity which transcends the difference. According to this view, the opposition between ideal inclusion and real exclusion vanishes. God _is_ the harmony of the real and ideal, not a mere arrangement for bringing them to an understanding with one another. Individuality and universality are no longer opposed conceptions, needing a _tertium quid_ to relate them, but are organic factors of reality, and this, at the same time, is intelligence. But admitting this conception as stating the implicit intention of Leibniz, the relation of monads to one another is wholly different from that which Leibniz gives. And to this point we now come. If in God, the absolute, the real and the ideal are one, it is impossible that in substances, which have their being and significance only in relation to God, or this unity, the real and the ideal should be so wholly separated as Leibniz conceives.