Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical ExpositionDewey, John
Philosophy
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
Dewey, John
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
Upon the origin and nature of desires Leibniz has much more to say
than about the impulses. His account of the transition from impulse
to desire is based upon the conception of unconscious ideas. Slight
and imperceptible impulses are working upon us all the time. Indeed,
they are a necessity; for the actual state of a soul or monad at any
time is, of course, one of incompleteness. Our nature must always work
to free itself from its hindrances and obtain its goal of complete
development. But it will not do this unless there is some stimulus,
some solicitation to induce it to overcome its limitation. There is
found accordingly in our every condition a feeling of dissatisfaction,
or, using Locke's word, of "uneasiness;" and it is this which
calls forth that activity which brings about a nearer approach to
the soul's real good. But Leibniz differs from Locke in saying that
this feeling of uneasiness is not a distinct, or even in most cases a
conscious, one. It is not pain, although it differs from pain only in
degree. Uneasiness and pain are related to each other as appetite for
food is to hunger,--the first suffices to stimulate us to satisfaction,
but if the want is not met, results in actual pain; if met, these "half
pains" become tributary to pleasure itself. These unconscious stimuli
to action result in actions which meet the want, and the aggregation of
these satisfactions results in pleasure. In Leibniz's own words:--
"If these elements of pain were themselves true pains, we should
always be in a state of misery, even in pursuing the good. But since
there is always going on a summation of minute successes in overcoming
these states of uneasiness, and these put us more and more at ease,
there comes about a decided pleasure, which often has greater value
even than the enjoyment of the good. Far, then, from regarding this
uneasiness as a thing incompatible with happiness, I find that it is
an essential condition of our happiness. For this does not consist
in perfect possession, which would make us insensible and stupid, but
in a constant progress towards greater results, which must always be
accompanied, accordingly, by this element of desire or uneasiness."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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