Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical ExpositionDewey, John
Philosophy
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
Dewey, John
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
Locke's ideas may be synopsized as follows: It is a sufficient account
of solidity to say that it is got by touch and that it arises from
the resistance found in bodies to the entrance of any other body. "It
is that which hinders the approach of two bodies when they are moved
towards one another." If not identical with matter, it is at all events
its most essential property. "This of all others seems the idea most
intimately connected with and essential to body, so as nowhere else
to be found or imagined, but only in matter." It is, moreover, the
source of the other properties of matter. "Upon the solidity of bodies
depend their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion." Solidity,
again, "is so inseparable an idea from body that upon that depends its
filling of space, its contact, impulse, and communication of motion
upon impulse." It is to be distinguished, therefore, from hardness, for
hardness is relative and derived, various bodies having various degrees
of it; while solidity consists in utter exclusion of other bodies from
the space possessed by any one, so that the hardest body has no more
solidity than the softest.
The close connection between solidity and matter makes it not only
possible, but necessary, to distinguish between matter and extension as
against the Cartesians, who had identified them. In particular Locke
notes three differences between these notions. Extension includes
neither solidity nor resistance; its parts are inseparable from one
another both really and mentally, and are immovable; while matter has
solidity, its parts are mutually separable, and may be moved _in_
space. From this distinction between space and matter it follows,
according to Locke, that there is such a thing as a vacuum, or that
space is not necessarily a plenum of matter. Matter is that which fills
space; but it is entirely indifferent to space whether or not it is
filled. Space is occupied by matter, but there is no essential relation
between them. Solidity is the essence of matter; emptiness is the
characteristic of space. "The idea of space is as distinct from that
of solidity as it is from that of scarlet color. It is true, solidity
cannot exist without extension, neither can scarlet color exist without
extension; but this hinders not that they are _distinct ideas_."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account