In Natal the situation has been changed by the action of Lord Roberts. The two Boer Republics are well aware that they must stand or fall together. Either the Boer Commander-in-Chief has decided to strike at Lord Roberts, in which case he must move the bulk of his force into the Free State, or he hopes to be in time to resist Lord Roberts after making an end of Sir George White. In the former case he must raise the siege of Ladysmith, for he cannot carry it on without a strong covering force to resist Sir Redvers Buller. Then there will be forty thousand British troops in Natal, whose advance will be almost as dangerous as that of Lord Roberts. In the latter case there can be little chance of a successful resistance to Lord Roberts, whose advance northwards from Bloemfontein would in due time compromise the safety of the Boer army. The reports do not enable us to feel sure which decision has been taken. Sir Redvers Buller's telegram of Wednesday to the effect that one of his divisions had crossed the Tugela and was opposed only by a rear guard looks very like a Boer withdrawal from Natal. A later unofficial telegram, describing a very strong position north of the Tugela held by the Boers to cover the siege, suggests that the Boer commander is again trying to lead his adversary into attack upon a prepared position. Each case has its favourable aspect. If the Boers are raising the siege the forces of Buller and White will in a few days be united, and need only good leading to force the passes and invade either the Free State or the Transvaal. If the Boers are determined to hold on to Ladysmith, they cannot effectively check the advance of Lord Roberts. While the war is going on the Nation ought to set its military forces in order. The Militia should be formed into divisions for the field and be shipped off to manoeuvring grounds at the Cape; they can be brought home as soon as it is certain they will not be wanted. The Volunteers could soon be formed into an army if the War Office would carry out the measures which have for years been urged upon it by Volunteer officers. The first step is to give the officers the authority which has hitherto been withheld from them, so that by its exercise they may form their characters; the second to give them the best instruction and encouragements to learn; the third to find them ground for ranges, for field firing and for manoeuvres. A minister of war who combined knowledge of war and of the Volunteers with a serious purpose would be able in two months to infuse the whole Volunteer force with the right ideal, and then, by mobilising them for another two months, to transform them into an army. It is for the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secure the four months that are needed. THE BOER DEFEATS _March 1st_, 1900 February has made up for the blunders of August and September, and retrieved the disasters of October, November, and December.