"That construction accords with the true meaning of the words 'corporate powers,' which is powers essential or incident to the nature of the artificial being created by law--such as the power to take a common name, to have corporate succession, to contract and be contracted with, and to sue and be sued as one person, etc. These are properly corporate powers. It is true the words are sometimes used to include all the powers which the particular corporation possesses; but that is a loose and inaccurate use. "I think that the correct interpretation of the publication is that it simply forbids the creation of a corporation by a special act of incorporation--nothing more. It does not forbid an act operating to enlarge, modify, or restrict the rights of an existing corporation, any more than it does a similar act in respect to a natural person in a like case. Still less does it forbid such legislation in respect to a foreign corporation. It is enough for the present case to say that the clause does not prohibit a legislative recognition or an express sanction of an existing comity of the State in favor of an existing corporation of another State. "1. I am, therefore, of opinion that a special act declaring the assent of the State of Ohio to the exercise within that State of all the powers necessary for a beneficial use of the Pittsburg, F. W. & Chicago Railroad by a corporation of Pennsylvania or Illinois, which should have become the owner of the part of such railroad situate within the State of Ohio, would be valid and effectual. "A general law would, of course, be somewhat preferable, as it would avoid this question. If it is certainly attainable, I would seek our legislation in that form. "But I foresee the possibility that it might excite more jealousy than a special act, because its full application and use cannot be certainly anticipated. I foresee, also, the possibility that it may affect special cases of existing interest, prejudice, or passion, of which I am ignorant. "In the first section of a draft of a general law which I have hastily made at a suggestion, I have tried to avoid the first of these two objections by limiting the cases to which the law applies. "1. An existing railroad. "2. Partly situate in Ohio and partly in some adjacent State. "3. Sold under an existing lien. "4. Acquired by a corporation of another State in which another part of the same railroad is situate. "5. Such corporation acquiring the part of the railroad situate in that other State. "6. Of course, such corporation having the capacity to take and operate the part situate in Ohio. "Perhaps I may have put in more limitations than are necessary. "Whether the measure will run foul of any other interest can be better judged of by men conversant with the state of affairs in Ohio and in its legislation.