"It is impossible to foresee, in the recent scramble of the European powers for the acquisition of colonies, how soon an occasion may arise for our putting in practice the Monroe Doctrine. It is clear that there ought to be some relation between our assertion of this doctrine, and our preparation to maintain it. "It is not intended to recommend any attempt to rival the great European powers in the creation of a powerful navy. The changes which have rapidly occurred by the diminution of the relative resisting power of the defensive armor of ironclads, and by the increased efficiency of modern artillery--which, on the whole, has gained in the competition--suggest that we should not, at present, enter largely into the creation of armored vessels. "In the questions that beset this subject until they shall have reached a solution, we can content ourselves with adding but sparingly to our navy. But what we can add should be the very best that experience and science can indicate. This prudential view is reinforced by the consideration that the annual charge of maintaining a war-vessel bears an important proportion to the original cost of construction. "In constructing permanent fortifications, and in providing an ample supply of the best modern artillery, the annual cost of maintenance is inconsiderable. Nearly the whole expenditure is in the original outlay for construction. "If we do not make this expenditure necessary to provide for our sea-coast defences when we have a surplus, and have no need to levy taxes, we certainly will not make those expenditures when we have no longer a surplus in the Treasury. "To leave our vast interests defenceless, in order to reduce the cost of whiskey to its consumers, would be a solecism.