Great Britain -- Politics and government -- 1837-1901; Liberalism -- Great Britain
There is, in addition, one principle of historic Liberalism with which
our present conception of the State is in full sympathy. The conception
of the common good as it has been explained can be realized in its
fullness only through the common will. There are, of course, elements of
value in the good government of a benevolent despot or of a fatherly
aristocracy. Within any peaceful order there is room for many good
things to flourish. But the full fruit of social progress is only to be
reaped by a society in which the generality of men and women are not
only passive recipients but practical contributors. To make the rights
and responsibilities of citizens real and living, and to extend them as
widely as the conditions of society allow, is thus an integral part of
the organic conception of society, and the justification of the
democratic principle. It is, at the same time, the justification of
nationalism so far as nationalism is founded on a true interpretation of
history. For, inasmuch as the true social harmony rests on feeling and
makes use of all the natural ties of kinship, of neighbourliness, of
congruity of character and belief, and of language and mode of life, the
best, healthiest, and most vigorous political unit is that to which men
are by their own feelings strongly drawn. Any breach of such unity,
whether by forcible disruption or by compulsory inclusion in a larger
society of alien sentiments and laws, tends to mutilate--or, at lowest,
to cramp--the spontaneous development of social life. National and
personal freedom are growths of the same root, and their historic
connection rests on no accident, but on ultimate identity of idea.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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