Liberty in the modern stateLaski, Harold J. (Harold Joseph)
Science
Liberty in the modern state
Laski, Harold J. (Harold Joseph)
Liberty; Political science
This, I suggest, is the kind of environment any plea for freedom
must meet in the modern state. Discussion of inessentials can be
ample and luxurious; discussion of essentials will always, where it
touches the heart of existing social arrangements, meet at least with
difficulty and probably with attack. It will find it extraordinarily
hard to organize supporters for its view, if this opposes the will of
those in authority. In wartime, any plea for reasonableness is at a
discount; and it was at a discount in England during the general
strike when the government sought at once for the conditions of a
belligerent atmosphere. Attack an interest, in a word, and you arouse
passion; arouse passion, especially where property is concerned, and
the technique of _raison d’état_ will sooner or later be invoked. But
liberty and _raison d’état_ are mutually incompatible for the simple
reason that _raison d’état_ is a principle which seeks, _a priori_, to
exclude rational discussion from the field. It seeks neither truth nor
justice, but surrender.
It is a technique, I think, which almost always comes into play when
dangerous opinion is challenged by the state. A good instance of this
is afforded by the trial of the British Communists in 1925. No one
could seriously claim that their effort constituted a serious menace
to the state, for they were a handful among millions, and there was
not even evidence that their propaganda met with any success. Yet
their condemnation was a foregone conclusion, granted the terms of the
indictment. And the habits of power were interestingly illustrated by
the judge who presided over the trial. He had conducted the case with
quite scrupulous fairness, and had shown no leaning to one side or the
other until the jury had rendered its verdict. He then made an offer
to the defendants that if they would abandon their belief in Communism
he would adjust the sentence in the light of that abandonment. He made
the offer, I do not doubt, in the utmost good faith and an entirely
sincere conviction that Communist opinions are morally wicked. But
that attitude was precisely similar to the Roman offer to the early
Christians: they could avoid the arena if they would offer but a
pinch of incense on the pagan altar. It was precisely similar to the
willingness of the Inquisitor to mitigate his sentence where there
is confession of heresy and repentance. Mr Justice Swift seemed to
have no realization at all that the defendants were Communists in the
light of an experience of social life which, for them, was as vivid
and compelling as the Christian revelation to its early adherents;
that the offer he made to them was mitigation of punishment in return
for the sacrifice of their sincerity; that the state, for him, was
Hobbes’ “moral God” at whose altar they must do reverence. His views,
of course, were the natural expression of his own experience of life,
and, without doubt, sincerely held; but they implied an inability
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