Many of the last observations are strictly applicable to the presiding Judge, McKinstry. We cannot believe that he had any affiliation with the clan, nor any sympathy for its continuance; but his reprehensible conduct on the trial can be better accounted for in the language of the competent gentleman who sat on the jury, and who had an opportunity of seeing and hearing and witnessing all, thus: “His strenuous ruling, strongly indicated to my mind, was to retain and maintain political influence with powerful cliques.” The changing of this Judge’s charges, the veering about first from one side to the other, his expressed determination to force a verdict against the better informed and more respectable of those who formed a great majority of the jury, if it required an indefinite period of confinement to do it; and then, in the last hours of torture, came squarely out and told the jury it was bound, from the law and evidence before it, to find a verdict of guilty; and all this while knowing the awful character of Shoemake, one of the main witnesses, as proven on the trial; and while knowing that G. Y. Overall had no right to prosecute in the name of G. Overall, when there were more of the same name in the place, and to which the jury believed the confessions applied as intended by Copeland; and more, after conviction, anticipating something righteously in favor of the defendant, this partial Judge declared his intention before hand not to sign any petition for the release of the defendant from the prison; all these incidents taken together are too strongly stamped to be explained away. The refusal of the defendant’s application against the strongest of reasons in contrast with his unreasonable granting the prosecution all it wanted for several years afterwards, is also something which will not soon be forgotten.