But with Cromwell the case was very different. The closing months of the year 1538 were the turning-point in his career, for they saw him take a step which was destined to bring him into collision with the King, and later to lead him to his death. The original difference of opinion between King and minister, which first came to the fore in the quarrel of 1536, now broke forth again under a slightly altered form, which it was destined to maintain till the end. At first we saw that Cromwell vented his distrust of the policy of neutrality in favouring a definite alliance with Spain. The changed situation on the Continent rendered a league with Charles impossible now, so that the only refuge that remained for England, if the policy which had been so successful in 1536 and 1537 really broke down, was to court an alliance with some power outside the two great continental rivals. And Cromwell, inexperienced, and overestimating the danger of foreign invasion, certainly believed that Henry’s efforts to maintain his old position between France and Spain were now doomed to inevitable failure. He did not see, as the King did, that the friendship of Charles and Francis was but temporary, and that the old quarrels were ultimately certain to break forth afresh. He looked the situation as it was squarely in the face, abandoned once and for all the policy of seeking safety by playing on the mutual jealousies of Charles and Francis; he frankly recognized the probability of war, and deliberately courted an outside league for England’s defence. As he had always considered the friendship of the Emperor more valuable than that of Francis, so he considered his enmity, which he now regarded as inevitable, as more to be feared. Consequently, in looking about for an alliance to fortify England, he sought one which could be most effectively directed against Charles.