countenance he ‘dyd conjecte He was not content with thEmperours wordes[686].’ Of course the intrigues of Norfolk and Wyatt were only one of a number of things which contributed to cause the quarrel between Charles and Francis to break out afresh. The ground had been pretty well prepared for it by a series of petty but annoying occurrences, which had taken place during the Emperor’s visit[687], and the efforts of the English ambassadors were substantially aided by Charles’ flat refusal to fulfil his promises to Francis about the Low Countries and Milan, after the subjugation of the revolt in Ghent had once more left him a free hand. But the part which England played in accelerating the rupture was in itself by no means inconsiderable, and it is of the most vital importance for our purposes here, to notice that the name of Cromwell scarcely appears once in connexion with it. It is true that after Norfolk had succeeded in driving in the first wedge which started the breach between Charles and Francis, the King’s minister wrote two letters to Wallop[688], directing him to follow up the advantage already gained, but they were evidently dictated by Henry, and seem to have been a necessity forced upon Cromwell by the action of his rival. The fact was that Cromwell’s identification with the German alliance had cut him off from bearing a hand in any other part of the foreign policy, and that his place as a negotiator with France and Spain had been usurped by his bitterest enemy, the Duke of Norfolk. The latter’s success at the French Court had proved that the policy to which the King had always pinned his faith, in opposition to Cromwell’s advocacy of an outside alliance, had not lost all its efficacy, and the rapidly widening breach between Charles and Francis showed that the league with Cleves was not indispensable for England’s safety. More than this, it now looked as if the treaty with Duke William, far from being an advantage, would become a positive burden. Cromwell had sought the alliance in the hope of gaining valuable aid in case England was attacked: it had not occurred to him that some day the positions might be reversed, and that England might be expected to give aid, rather than to receive it. The fact that Charles, instead of planning an invasion of England with Francis, had gone straight from Paris to the Low Countries[689] and did not disguise his intention of regaining Gelderland, rendered this disagreeable turn of affairs distinctly probable. Worst of all, the King’s disgust for Anne of Cleves had increased so rapidly, that it was useless to attempt to conceal it. Henry might pardon a political blunder alone, but when combined with a matrimonial misfortune, it was more difficult to forgive. Everything seemed to unite to call for a reversal of the Cromwellian policy. The King’s minister had abandoned as hopeless a scheme which his rival had been able to show was still feasible; he had