began to occupy his exclusive attention, and the foreign affairs of the next three years were left almost entirely in Wolsey’s hands. Circumstances now drove the Cardinal temporarily to lose sight of the policy which he had pursued for the most part up to this time--that of strict neutrality--and to attempt to convert the peace with France into a permanent alliance. And certainly the events of 1527 seemed to give him every justification for this new departure. The sack of Rome appeared to put Italy at the mercy of the Imperialists, and now the difficulties connected with Henry’s matrimonial affairs pointed to the need of securing a firm ally who would aid him in persuading the captive Pontiff to consent to the divorce in opposition to the wishes of his jailor the Emperor. With all his experience the Cardinal had hardly learned how rapidly the diplomatic combinations of Europe could change. The last great venture of his foreign policy resulted in disaster: the French alliance utterly failed to accomplish what was expected of it. At first indeed it seemed that the matrimonial projects which formed the basis of it would succeed, but the crafty policy of Francis ruined all. His war with the Emperor broke out again, as was to be expected, immediately after his release from captivity, but secret negotiations for peace were soon set on foot, and finally, in 1529, took shape in the treaty of Cambray--the news of which came as a stunning blow to Wolsey’s dearest hopes. The lesson which the Cardinal learned at the expense of his office was by no means lost on his master. Absorbed in the attempt to obtain a divorce from Katherine, Henry possibly had not been able to foresee the course of events abroad any better than his minister; but when, in 1529, the news of the treaty of Cambray aroused him to a true appreciation of the state of affairs, he at once realized how dangerous any permanent alliance with either Francis or Charles would be, as long as the situation on the Continent remained so uncertain. He resolved that, as soon as he could rectify the Cardinal’s false step, nothing should tempt him again to abandon the only safe policy--that of strict neutrality between the two great European powers--as long as the two rivals remained nearly equal. This point has been purposely dwelt upon here as a foreshadowing of what was to happen to Cromwell a few years later. Departure from the policy of neutrality between France and Spain helped to ruin Wolsey: a similar blunder in foreign affairs was destined to lead his successor to destruction.