Before the election of 64, in which Cicero stood for the consulship, Catiline became ever more a demagogue and made an alliance with the unprincipled Antonius. These two men received the support of Caesar and Crassus, but of course not of the moderates. The conservative element of the state disliked to vote for a _novus homo_ like Cicero, but the only other sound candidates were Cornificius and Galba, who were little known and fairly sure of defeat. Cicero was certain to get most of the equestrian vote, he would draw heavily from the popular vote because of his well-known liberal connections, he had the favor of Pompeian soldiers and adherents, and on economic and social questions he could be trusted. The optimates therefore decided to support him although he was not one of them. But the veering was not all on their part. Cicero also had learned from the talk of Catiline, Caesar, and Crassus that the Gracchan theory of popular sovereignty without a senatorial check might lead to dangerous economic and imperialistic legislation. He accordingly abandoned the theory that the senate had no constitutional right to interfere in the popular will, a theory which he had supported in 66 and 65. He doubtless said so in the senate before election day, when saying so would count. At any rate very soon after he assumed office, when the question of the senate’s _auctoritas_ came up in Caesar’s prosecution of Rabirius, he threw all his energy into the defense of Rabirius and the senate’s right to proclaim martial law,[9] and he did so by reminding the people that their great leader Marius, contrary to his party politics, had recognized the authority of the senate when a great crisis came. This served well as an apology, if one were needed, for his own abandonment of the central democratic doctrine when his eyes had been opened to its dangers. Cicero thus led the knights into a coalition with the optimates and continued through the year to cement a _concordia ordinum_.