5. The finances were ruined--not through the expenses the king incurred (although many of the latter were unnecessary, as, for instance, the colonists, the costly factories, the forced development of the arts, taste, and luxury, far beyond the resources of the country, the disproportionate augmentation of the army, and the support of a commerce which was not adapted to the nature of the country, while its true and natural industry was neglected), but in consequence of the prevalent disorder, the worthless operations, and the manœuvres so often carried on for private objects. 6. The influence of foreign courts and their ministers had been for some time past great and oppressive. As the mainspring in negociations is complaisance, nought but a dependence could result from this, which could not be compensated by any resulting benefit. As a rule, more expense and attention was devoted to this portion of the business of the state than the nature and circumstances of the country required. 7. Lastly, the great and small offices, distinctions, and honorary titles, were too numerous for the size of the state, too oppressive for the country, and, at the same time, valueless. Everybody wished to live and enrich himself at the cost of the king; there was no impulse among the nobility to serve his Majesty with their fortune and strength, and in the other classes no inclination to seek self-support in industry. I will not decide how far these reproaches are founded, but for my part I was convinced of their truth by everything I afterwards experienced, though without accusing one or the other minister personally of being the cause. In matters of state, success in most cases decides the value of an administration, in the present case it decided against it. When I acquired influence in affairs through the king's confidence, my design merely was to induce his Majesty to examine into them himself, and for this reason I believed it was necessary that the king should have about him other persons holding opinions opposed to those of the then existing ministry. If, afterwards, alterations and resolutions with this object followed more rapidly, this was caused rather by the personal sentiments of the king, and by accidental circumstances, than by any regular resolution or plan--at least, as far as concerned myself. With regard to the king's wishes successive steps were necessary, for his Majesty was more than too willing to undertake such changes. On my joining the king, I found his mind, temper, and inclination full of aversion from the ministry, and this always remained so. If, for my part, I did not try to change his sentiments so far as my conviction admitted, on the other hand, prior to the Holstein progress, I did not strive to imbue the king with any favourable idea of the persons belonging to the opposite party. It is well known that his Majesty, from the beginning of his reign, desired changes in the ministry.