6. The king found no difficulty in carrying out what he pleased, and I was ever of opinion, and had always heard, that in a sovereign state the form should be kept as simple as possible: that good principles, and the desire to act well, were the best means to keep a king from abusing his power: and that other difficulties impeded the execution of great and useful plans, without preventing the results of a bad appliance of the authority. 7. All the time I was minister, the cabinet orders were sent to the colleges and heads of departments. The latter could then raise objections especially in cases where such regulations were contrary to the laws and earlier royal resolutions. 8. I thus acquired no personal authority, except in so far as the king granted me his confidence. 9. I thus deprived myself of the means of mis-applying the king's confidence to designs opposed to his interests, and if I had any such designs, of which I am not conscious, however, they can be very easily detected in the copies preserved in the cabinet. 10. As regards the king's signature, several persons, especially Councillor of Conference Schumacher, know what his Majesty thought of it, and that this was the reason why all the cabinet orders were not signed by the king. Although I have thus declared with the greatest truthfulness the sentiments with which I employed the king's confidence, I do not venture to decide how far, on the whole, the changes that resulted were advantageous or injurious. The result must prove this, and for this the time during which they have existed is too short. So much, however, I believe I may assert, that the economic arrangements at court, as well as the management of the royal privy treasury, were advantageous, and will produce considerable savings: and further, that the financial system is established on a sound basis, as the price of corn in Copenhagen this winter will prove, how far correct measures were taken in that matter;--that all the expenses of the last year have been paid, and the resources which the extraordinary ones required, were not oppressive for the country;--that the arrangement of the Chanceries and Colleges of Justice is advantageous;--that the persons whom I proposed as officials, three or four excepted, as I might be mistaken about them, possessed the requisite ability for what they were employed in;--and lastly, that there has been no delay in the settlement of business. It was unavoidable that defects should have crept in here and there, which I certainly felt, but could not possibly prevent. If private persons have suffered, the intention always was to employ such persons again, and give them compensation.