Life and Times of Washington, Volume 2: Revised, Enlarged, and EnrichedSchroeder, John Frederick
History
Life and Times of Washington, Volume 2: Revised, Enlarged, and Enriched
Schroeder, John Frederick
Presidents -- United States -- Biography; Washington, George, 1732-1799
Lee appeared on the heights of Freehold soon after Cornwallis had left
them, and following the British into the plain ordered General Wayne to
attack the rear of their covering party with sufficient vigor to check
it, but not to press it so closely as either to force it up to the main
body or to draw reinforcements to its aid. In the meantime he intended
to gain the front of this party by a shorter road, and, intercepting its
communication with the line, to bear it off before it could be assisted.
While in the execution of this design an officer in the suite of
Washington came up to gain intelligence and Lee communicated to him his
present object. Before he reached the point of destination, however,
there was reason to believe that the British rear was much stronger
than had been conjectured. The intelligence on this subject being
contradictory, and the face of the country well calculated to conceal
the truth, he deemed it advisable to ascertain the fact himself.
Sir Henry Clinton, soon after the rear division was in full march,
received intelligence that an American column had appeared on his left
flank. This, being a corps of militia, was soon dispersed and the march
was continued. When his rear guard had descended from the heights he
saw it followed by a strong corps, soon after which a cannonade was
commenced upon it, and at the same time a respectable force showed
itself on each of his flanks. Suspecting a design on his baggage he
determined to attack the troops in his rear so vigorously as to compel
a recall of those on his flanks, and for this purpose marched back his
whole rear division. This movement was in progress as Lee advanced for
the purpose of reconnoitering. He soon perceived his mistake respecting
the force of the British rear, but still determined to engage on that
ground although his judgment disapproved the measure--there being a
morass immediately in his rear, which would necessarily impede the
reinforcements which might be advancing to his aid and embarrass his
retreat should he be finally overpowered. This was about 10. While both
armies were preparing for action General Scott (as stated by General
Lee) mistook an oblique march of an American column for a retreat, and
in the apprehension of being abandoned left his position and repassed
the ravine in his rear.
Being himself of opinion that the ground was unfavorable Lee did not
correct the error he ascribed to Scott but ordered the whole detachment
to regain the heights. He was closely pressed and some slight
skirmishing ensued without much loss on either side.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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