"It is much to be feared, my dear sir, that the States in their separate capacities have very inadequate ideas of the present danger. Many persons removed far distant from the scene of action and seeing and hearing such publications only as flatter their wishes, conceive that the contest is at an end and that to regulate the government and police of their own State is all that remains to be done, but it is devoutly to be wished that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them like a thunderclap that is little expected. I do not mean to designate particular States. I wish to cast no reflections upon any one. The public believe (and if they do believe it, the fact might almost as well be so) that the States at this time are badly represented and that the great and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted for want either of abilities or application in the members, or through the discord and party views of some individuals. That they should be so is to be lamented more at this time than formerly, as we are far advanced in the dispute and, in the opinion of many, drawing to a happy period; we have the eyes of Europe upon us and I am persuaded many political spies to watch, who discover our situation and give information of our weaknesses and wants." We have already seen that Congress, actuated by their wishes rather than governed by a temperate calculation of the means in their possession, had, in the preceding winter, planned a second invasion of Canada to be conducted by Lafayette and that, as the generals only were got in readiness for this expedition, it was necessarily laid aside. The design, however, seems to have been suspended, not abandoned. The alliance with France revived the latent wish to annex that extensive territory to the United States. That favorite subject was resumed, and toward autumn a plan was completely digested for a combined attack to be made by the allies on all the British dominions on the continent and on the adjacent islands of Cape Breton and Newfoundland. This plan was matured about the time Lafayette obtained leave to return to his own country and was ordered to be transmitted by him to Doctor Franklin, the minister of the United States at the court of Versailles with instructions to induce, if possible, the French cabinet to accede to it. Some communications respecting this subject were also made to Lafayette, on whose influence in securing its adoption by his own government much reliance was placed, and in October 1778, it was for the first time transmitted to Washington, with a request that he would enclose it by Lafayette, with his observations on it, to Doctor Franklin. This very extensive plan of military operations for the ensuing campaign, prepared entirely in the cabinet without consulting, so far as is known, a single military man, consisted of many parts.