In this state of mind Washington received the magnificent plan already prepared by Congress. He was forcibly struck with the impracticability of executing that part of it which, was to be undertaken by the United States should the British armies continue in the country and with the serious mischief which would result to the common cause as well as from diverting so considerable a part of the French force from other objects to one which was, in his opinion, so unpromising as from the ill impression which would be made on the court and nation by the total failure of the American government to execute its part of a plan originating with itself--a failure would most probably sacrifice the troops and ships employed by France. On comparing the naval force of England with that of France in different parts of the world, the former appeared to Washington to maintain a decided superiority and consequently to possess the power of shutting up the ships of the latter which might be trusted into the St. Lawrence. To suppose that the British government would not avail itself of this superiority on such an occasion would be to impute to it a blind infatuation or ignorance of the plans of its adversary, which could not be safely assumed in calculations of such serious import. A plan, too, consisting of so many parts to be prosecuted both from Europe and America by land and by water--which, to be successful, required such an harmonious cooperation of the whole, such a perfect coincidence of events--appeared to him to be exposed to too many accidents to risk upon it interests of such high value. In a long and serious letter to Congress he apologized for not obeying their orders to deliver the plan with his observations upon it to Lafayette, and entering into a full investigation of all its parts demonstrated the mischiefs and the dangers with which it was replete. This letter was referred to a committee whose report admits the force of the reasons urged by Washington against the expedition and their own conviction that nothing important could be attempted unless the British armies should be withdrawn from the United States and that even in that event the present plan was far too complex. Men, however, recede slowly and reluctantly from favorite and flattering projects on which they have long meditated, and the committee in their report proceeded to state the opinion that the posts held by the British in the United States would probably be evacuated before the active part of the ensuing campaign, and that, therefore, eventual measures for the expedition ought to be taken.