If anything were necessary to be added to this ridiculous scheme for the conquest of Canada in order to prove the inefficiency and folly of the Congress of 1778 we have it in the fact that France was averse to adding that province to the United States and did not desire to acquire it for herself. She only sought the independence of this country and its permanent alliance. Mr. De Sevelinges in his introduction to Botta's History recites the private instructions to Mr. Gerard on his mission to the United States. One article was, "to avoid entering into any formal engagement relative to Canada and other English possessions which Congress proposed to conquer." Mr. De Sevelinges adds, that "the policy of the cabinet of Versailles viewed the possession of those countries, especially of Canada by England as a principle of useful inquietude and vigilance to the Americans. The neighborhood of a formidable enemy must make them feel more sensibly the price which they ought to attach to the friendship and support of the King of France." [C.] REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONFER WITH WASHINGTON ON THE SECOND SCHEME FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA, AND ON THE GENERAL STATE OF THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY. "January I, 1779. The committee appointed to confer with the commander-in-chief on the operations of the next campaign, report that the plan proposed by Congress for the emancipation of Canada, in cooperation with an army from France, was the principal subject of the said conference. That, impressed with a strong sense of the injury and disgrace which must attend an infraction of the proposed stipulations, on the part of these States, your committee have taken a general view of our finances, of the circumstances of our army, of the magazines of clothes, artillery, arms and ammunition, and of the provisions in store, and which can be collected in season. "Your committee have also attentively considered the intelligence and observations communicated to them by the commander-in-chief, respecting the number of troops and strongholds of the enemy in Canada; their naval force, and entire command of the water communication with that country; the difficulties, while they possess such signal advantages, of penetrating it with an army by land; the obstacles which are to be surmounted in acquiring a naval superiority; the hostile temper of many of the surrounding Indian tribes towards these States; and above all, the uncertainty whether the enemy will not persevere in their system of harassing and distressing our sea-coast and frontiers by a predatory war.