In the West and South-west followed the successful battle at Mill Spring, Kentucky; the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, compelling the evacuation of Nashville, and ridding Kentucky of any organized rebel force; the hardly contested, but successful battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, relieving Missouri, in a great degree; victory for our arms wrested from the jaws of defeat at Shiloh; and the occupation of New Orleans, giving control of the Mouth of the Mississippi. What at the East?--Roanoke Island. Touching the movements of the Army of the Potomac, to which the country looked so expectantly for grand results, efficiently officered, thoroughly disciplined, and splendidly equipped as it was known or supposed to be, the first difficulty was to fix upon a plan. For the purpose of leading the attention of its General to something like a definite decision however, the order of January 27th was succeeded by the following: “_Executive Mansion, Washington_, January 31st, 1862. “ORDERED, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the Commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before, or on the twenty-second day of February next. “ABRAHAM LINCOLN.” General McClellan objecting to this movement and earnestly urging a plan of advance upon Richmond by the Lower Rappahannock with Urbana as a base, the President addressed him the following letter: “_Executive Mansion, Washington_, February 3d, 1862. “MY DEAR SIR:--You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac; yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad south-west of Manassas. “If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: “First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of _time_ and _money_ than mine? “Second. Wherein is a victory _more certain_ by your plan than mine? “Third. Wherein is a victory _more valuable_ by your plan than mine? “Fourth. In fact, would it not be _less_ valuable in this that it would break no great line of the enemy’s communications, while mine would? “Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? “Yours, truly, A. LINCOLN. “MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.” Which plain, practical questions were never directly answered.