as to improvements, magnify the _evil_, and stoutly refuse to see any good in them? “Mr. Chairman, on the third position of the message (the Constitutional question) I have not much to say. Being the man I am, and speaking when I do, I feel that in any attempt at an original, Constitutional argument, I should not be, and ought not to be, listened to patiently. The ablest and the best of men have gone over the whole ground long ago. I shall attempt but little more than a brief notice of what some of them have said. In relation to Mr. Jefferson’s views, I read from Mr. Polk’s veto message: “‘President Jefferson, in his message to Congress in 1806, recommended an amendment of the Constitution, with a view to apply an anticipated surplus in the treasury ‘to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improvements as it may be thought proper to add to the Constitutional enumeration of the Federal powers.’ And he adds: ‘I suppose an amendment to the Constitution, by consent of the States, necessary because the objects now recommended are not among those enumerated in the Constitution, and to which it permits the public moneys to be applied.’ In 1825, he repeated, in his published letters, the opinion that no such power had been conferred upon Congress.’ “I introduce this, not to controvert, just now, the Constitutional opinion, but to show, that on the question of _expediency_, Mr. Jefferson’s opinion was against the present President--that this opinion of Mr. Jefferson, in one branch at least, is, in the hands of Mr. Polk, like McFingal’s gun: “‘Bears wide and kicks the owner over.’ “But, to the Constitutional question. In 1826, Chancellor Kent first published his Commentaries on American Law. He devoted a portion of one of the lectures to the question of the authority of Congress to appropriate public moneys for internal improvements. He mentions that the question had never been brought under judicial consideration, and proceeds to give a brief summary of the discussions it had undergone between the legislative and executive branches of the Government. He shows that the legislative branch had usually been _for_, and the executive _against_, the power, till the period of Mr. J. Q. Adams’ administration; at which point he considers the executive influence as withdrawn from opposition, and added to the support of the power. In 1844, the Chancelor published a new edition of his Commentaries, in which he adds some notes of what had transpired on the question since 1826. I have not time to read the original text, or the notes, but the whole may be found on page 267, and the two or three following pages of the first volume of the edition of 1844. As what Chancellor Kent seems to consider the sum of the whole, I read from one of the notes: