Another reason for preserving this section is, that without it there would be no uniformity in the construction and administration of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. If the courts of twenty-four distinct, sovereign States, each possess the power, in the last resort, of deciding upon the Constitution and laws of the United States, their construction may be different in every State of the Union. That act of Congress which conforms to the Constitution of the United States, and is valid in the opinion of the supreme court of Georgia, may be a direct violation of the provisions of that instrument, and be void in the judgment of the supreme court of South Carolina. A State law in Virginia might in this manner be declared constitutional, whilst the same law, if passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, would be void. Nay, what would be still more absurd, a law or treaty of the United States with a foreign nation, admitted to be constitutionally made, might secure rights to the citizens of one State, which would be denied to those of another. Although the same Constitution and laws govern the Union, yet the rights acquired under them would vary with every degree of latitude. Surely the framers of the Constitution would have left their work incomplete, had they established no common tribunal to decide its own construction, and that of the laws and treaties made under its authority. They are not liable to this charge, because they have given express power to the Judiciary of the Union over “all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.” The first Congress of the United States have, to a considerable extent, carried this power into execution by the passage of the judicial act, and it contains no provision more important than the 25th section.