Without entering into an argument upon the general question, which would be altogether misplaced upon the present occasion, it may not be improper to observe that the principle applies with redoubled force to Senators in Congress. They represent the sovereign States, who are the parties to that constitutional compact which called the federal union into existence. In the Senate, these States are represented as distinct communities, each entitled to the same number of votes, without regard to their population. In that body they are all equal, as they were before the adoption of the federal constitution. Here, emphatically, if any where, the voice of the States ought to be heard, and ought to be obeyed. Shall it then be said that a Senator possesses the constitutional right to violate the express instructions of the sovereign State which he represents, and wield the power and the vote which have been conferred upon him for the benefit of his constituents in a manner which they have solemnly declared to be ruinous to their dearest interests, or dangerous to their liberties! The bare statement of the proposition carries conviction to my mind. All, or nearly all the State Legislatures, have long been in the practice of instructing their Senators, and this affords the strongest evidence of the principle upon which the custom is founded. It has been objected, that the right of instruction may destroy the tenure of the Senatorial office, and render it subject to all the political fluctuations in the several States. But the Senator is only bound to obey: he is not called upon to resign. And although there may be circumstances in which a man of honor might feel himself constrained to retire from the public service rather than give the vote of his State against his own convictions, yet these cases must, from their nature, be of rare occurrence. Besides, this objection implies an entire want of confidence in the State legislatures. It supposes that they may become the instruments of faction for the purpose of harassing Senators, and compelling them to resign. In fact, it results in the principle that the people are incapable of managing their own concerns, and are, therefore, under the necessity of conferring an irresponsible political power upon one of their own number, to save them from themselves. From the nature of our institutions, we must repose such a degree of confidence in the State legislatures as to presume that they will not abuse the power with which they have been intrusted. If it should ever clearly appear, in any case, that the immediate representatives of the people have not obeyed their will in voting instructions, this might present an exception to the general rule. Such an occurrence, however, though possible, is highly improbable. It is not to be presumed that State legislatures will exercise this important power, unless upon grave and solemn occasions, after mature deliberation and a thorough knowledge of the public will.